HP has been searching for a permanent chief executive for about six months.
Former CEO Enrique Lores retired in February, and HP appointed board member Bruce Broussard as interim CEO. The board formed a search committee and retained an executive search firm, but a permanent replacement is yet to be named.
Research suggests that filling a Fortune 500 CEO position often takes six to nine months. That does not necessarily mean HP’s search has been going badly or is excessively overdue. CEO searches at large public companies can take time, especially when boards consider candidates from several industries.
Still, the delay raises an awkward question: Is HP having trouble finding the right person, or persuading that person to take the job?
HP has said little publicly about the process.
The next CEO will inherit a daunting set of challenges. This is not a typical turnaround assignment where a new leader cuts costs, streamlines operations, and restores discipline. HP already knows how to do those things.
The harder job is deciding what HP should become as the printing business continues its long decline and the PCs settle into the economics of a mature category. Finding a meaningful new growth business must be the next CEO’s first priority.
HP remains a large, profitable, and technically capable company. It has one of the strongest brands in technology, global distribution, deep commercial relationships, a massive installed base, sophisticated supply-chain operations, and generations of hardware-engineering expertise.
Recent performance does not point to an imminent financial crisis. HP reported fiscal second-quarter revenue of $14.4 billion, up 9% from a year earlier. Personal Systems revenue increased 13% to $10.2 billion, driven by AI PCs and the Windows 11 upgrade cycle. Printing generated $4.2 billion with an operating margin of 18.3%.
However, those numbers can mask the deeper problem: PC unit volume declined 7% year over year despite revenue growth. Consumer printing revenue fell 10% year over year, while total printing hardware units dropped 7%. Better pricing, product mix, and commercial demand helped HP. Those levers can support earnings, but they cannot produce endless growth.
AI PCs matter, but every major PC vendor will sell them. They represented 44% of HP’s shipments in the second quarter, yet AI functionality is quickly becoming a category requirement for all PC OEMs rather than a durable source of differentiation.
The next CEO cannot confuse participation in a technology transition with ownership of it.
HP can sell powerful AI PCs without changing its long-term growth profile. It can make printers smarter, add services, improve its commercial mix, and reduce costs.
Those moves may protect margins, but they will not create the substantial revenue growth HP ultimately needs.
That is the strategic decision facing the board: HP can remain an efficient PC-and-print company, manage two mature franchises, and return cash to shareholders. The company already missed major waves in smartphones, tablets, cloud computing, and autonomous digital AI.
Or — it can use its legacy businesses to finance a serious effort to build its next growth engine, potentially in physical AI robotics, ambient computing, or AI wearables.
The next CEO will inherit another hurdle that is harder to measure: HP’s intensely conservative management culture.
HP has spent decades mastering large hardware businesses. Its systems reward predictability,…